In this paper, we present estimates of the incumbency advantage that correct for strategic retirement (and possibly other problems) using the natural experiments that arise from term limits imposed on statewide executives and state legislators. Term limits create ideal conditions for a natural experiment because term limits are exogenous to the particular factors that make individual incumbents safe or vulnerable in a particular year. We use term limits to construct an instrumental variable estimator for the incumbency e®ect. We also apply this method to correct for endogenous challenger entry.
We study state elections from 1978 to 2000. Over this period, the use of term limits varies considerably across states, across o±ces, and over time. Term limits strongly predict retirement rates, and the variation across o±ces and over time allows us to assess the validity of the natural experiment. Importantly, because term limits act as valid instruments for the incidence of incumbent contested races, our approach potentially corrects for problems beyond strategic retirement, including measurement errors and ommitted variables. In addition, our analysis exploits the panel structure of state executive and legislative elections to control for the normal vote and national and state tides in elections.
The results of the analysis indicate that strategic retirement is less of a problem than is sometimes thought. We contrast the results of the natural experiment with conventional ordinary least squares estimates and¯nd statistically signi¯cant evidence of bias in the regression estimates. However, the magnitude of the bias in regression analyses is substantively small|about one-percentage point of the vote. Importantly, the analysis contradicts the strategic retirement hypothesis directly: instrumenting for incumbency produces e®ects that are somewhat higher than the simple OLS estimators. Section 2 of this paper presents the logic of the statistical design and the data used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the factors that predict retirement rates and analysis of the quality of the instrumental variables. Section 4 presents the estimated incumbency advantages. Section 5 applies our approach to challenger quality. Section 6 considers the correlated with the vote. Scandals might be such a variable.
implications for our understanding of elections and methods for studying voting patterns.
Data and Methods
We study all partisan, statewide elections from 1978 to 2000 and state legislative elections from 1994 to 2000. We extend the speci¯cations developed by Gelman and King (1990) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) to incorporate instrumental variables for incumbency, indicators of challenger political experience, and alternative measures of the normal vote. A companion paper (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2001 ) discusses the incumbency advantages and party normal votes produced by the Gelman-King and Levitt-Wolfram models applied to state executives and legislative races. Our focus here is on the hypothesis that strategic retirement produces substantial biases in regression models of the incumbency e®ect.
A. Statistical Model of the Incumbency E®ect
All estimates of the incumbency advantage contrast the average vote in seats where incumbents are running for reelection with the average vote in seats where no incumbent is running. Retirement slump and sophomore surge, two early estimation approaches in this literature, compute the di®erence in the vote for a given seat between one election when an incumbent is running and another election when that individual is no longer an incumbent (e.g., Erikson 1971 Erikson , 1972 Alford and Brady, 1989) . Regression models, such as Gelman and King (1990) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) , perform a similar contrast, but introduce statistical controls for the normal vote in the district and partisan tides.
The statistical model of the incumbency e®ect that we use divides the two-party vote into several components: normal party vote in a state or district, annual tides or swings, incumbency e®ects, and local idiosyncratic variation.
Let i index o±ces, j index states, and t index years. Let V ijt be the share of the two-party vote received by the Democratic candidate running for o±ce i in state j in year t. There are two incumbency variables: D ijt = 1 if the Democratic candidate running for o±ce i in state j in year t is an incumbent, and 0 otherwise; R ijt = 1 if the Republican candidate running for o±ce i in state j in year t is an incumbent, and 0 otherwise. Assuming the advantages are symmetricy, we can de¯ne I ijt = D ijt ¡R ijt . 5 The speci¯cation relating Vote Shares to Incumbency is as follows:
The state¯xed-e®ects (® j ) capture the underlying partisanship (normal vote) in each state or district, and the year¯xed-e®ects (µ t ) capture national tides.
Existing research uses this framework to address the e®ects of partisan tides and the normal vote. Omitting these factors from the model can bias estimates of the incumbency e®ect (Gelman and King, 1990 , pages 1143 -1149 . We include measures of tides, quality and normal vote in the data analysis, and discuss the measurement of these factors below.
No analysis has addressed directly the endogeneity of incumbency, which arises from strategic retirements and omitted factors. That is the focus of our research design, to which we now turn.
B. Design of the Natural Experiment
To correct for the endogeneity of incumbency we use the natural experiment created by term limits. The dependent variable in this natural experiment is the vote share receive by the incumbent party's candidate. The \treatment group" consists of those races in which an incumbent runs for reelection. The \control group" consists of those races in which no incumbent runs, open seats. This is analogous to a clinical trial in which some participants take a treatment (say a drug) and some do not.
Control in any experiment (true or natural) derives not from the taking of the treatment but from the \assignment" of the treatment: some people are assigned to a control group 5 We allowed Democrats and Republicans to have di®erent incumbency advantages, but we found no statistically signi¯cant di®erences between them. In elections immediately following each decennial redistricting, there are a few U.S. House races and state legislative races in which both parties' candidates are incumbents. We drop the year just after each redistricting, so these never appear in our analysis. and others to a treatment group. Only those who are eligible to participate can; however, some who are assigned to the treatment do not participate or comply (e.g., do not take the drug). In this respect, term limits are an ideal \assignment" for a natural experiment. Only those politicians eligible to run for election can. Any incumbents who faces term limits must retire, regardless of the chances that they would win for reelection. Some of those who do not have to retire run for reelection, but some retire voluntarily. Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) show that assignment variables can be used to correct for the biases created by voluntary compliance with the treatment. Speci¯cally, term limits can be used to construct an unbiased instrumental variables estimator of the e®ect of incumbency on the vote.
6 One important condition must hold. The assignment variable|in our case, term limits|must not a®ect the dependent variable (the vote) directly. This \exclud-ability" assumption seems plausible, especially with state¯xed-e®ects in the analysis. Term limits are imposed prior to a given race, sometimes decades earlier, and likely do not a®ect speci¯c races directly outside of whether an incumbent can run. A central concern with excludability is whether the o±ces or states that term limits represent an unusual group.
Below we will consider these objections.
The analysis has two stages. In the¯rst stage we predict retirements using measures of the normal vote and national tides, as well as an indicator of whether the incumbent is termlimited or can run again. Let CR ijt and CD ijt indicate whether a Republican incumbent or a Democratic incumbent, respectively, can run again. Further, let C ijt = CD ijt ¡ CR ijt .
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The¯rst stage reduced form equations are:
In the second stage, the predicted value of I is, then, used instead of the observed incumbency to predict the vote in equation (1). Consider the simple bivariate case, in which only incumbency is used to predict the vote and only term limits are used to predict incumbency. Let n be the total number of cases; k is number of incumbents eligible to run for election (the number of seats not subject to term limit ); and m is the number of incumbents running. Recall that V is the vote, C indicates whether the incumbent can run, and I indicates whether the incumbent is running.
The instrumental variables estimator equals the simple di®erences of means estimator plus the di®erence between the control group used (i.e., all open seats) and the true control group (i.e., the seats made open through term limits). In the limit where k = n, that is where only those who are term-limited retire, the estimator is simply the di®erence between the pure control group (C=0) and the treatment group (I=0).
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C. Data
We study statewide elections from 1978 to 2000 are the decades when the incumbency advantage is largest, and when strategic retirement is expected to have a large e®ect on conventional estimates of the incumbency advantage. Also, survey
8 The derivation follows from algebraic manipulation of the simple IV estimator: Imbens, and Rubin (1996) Table A .1 provides information on the o±ces covered and data sources. Ansolabehere and
Snyder (2001) provides other information about the data. 9 .
Following the main current of the incumbency advantage literature, the dependent variable in our analysis is vote-shares. Alternatively, we could study re-election rates. Study of re-election rates involves rede¯nition of several concepts, such as normal vote, and presents several methodological problems, such as heterogeneity in the standard deviations, which are best estimated using the votes. In this respect, studying the votes is the¯rst step to understanding reelection probabilities.
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Partisan tides|national swings toward one of the parties|are readily incorporated into the regression model using indicator variables for each year.
Measuring the normal vote presents a greater challenge. Previous research has captured the normal vote with three alternative measures:¯xed-e®ects for states and districts (Levitt 9 In this paper we do not included judicial o±ces, and we also drop o±ces that are elected in fewer than ve states (e.g., Arizona is the only state with an elected commissioner of mines, and Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma are the only states with elected corporation commissioners.)
10 There is some confusion in the literature between vote margin and reelection probabilities. The belief that governors, U.S. senators, and U.S. House members have di®ering incumbency advantages emerges from the study of reelection rates. The observation that incumbency advantages have grown dramatically emanates from the study of vote margins. Reelection rates have not changed as much as vote margins, owing in part to the non-linear relationship between them (e.g., Kendall and Stuart, 1950) . Other issues to resolve in the study of re-election rates involve the di®erence between survival rates and reelection rates (e.g., Glazer and Grofman, 1987) .
and Wolfram, 1997), survey-based measures of state party identi¯cation (Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993; Wright, et al., n.d.) , and lagged vote corrected with lagged party control (Gelman and King, 1990) . For statewide races, all three measures are available, and we can compare the estimates with these alternative models directly. For statewide races, thē xed-e®ects and survey measures produce statistically indistinguishable estimates of the incumbency advantage. There appears to be a slight bias in the use of lagged vote, of about 1 percentage point. This likely emerges because lagged vote loses all cases that were uncontested in the previous election, and this can create selection bias. We use separate speci¯cations for state legislatures. In one speci¯cation we use district-speci¯c¯xed-e®ects, as in Levitt and Wolfram (1997) . The other employs lagged vote and lagged party control.
In the analysis of the incumbency e®ect, we distinguish the types of o±ces. We allow for heterogeneity in incumbency advantages by grouping the statewide elected o±cers into \High" (HI) and \Low" (LO) o±ceholders. The HI o±ces are governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, secretary of state, and U.S. Senator. The LO o±ces are auditor, treasurer, and various commissioners. We do this mainly to gain e±ciency. Analysis of each o±ce separately shows that the clustering is appropriate.
The natural experiment uses term limits to predict which seats will be open. Data on term limits come from a review of each state's statutes and constitutions and from reports in the Book of the States. Table A2 . lists all elected state o±ces subject to term limitations.
For those o±ces for which the term limit was imposed after 1978, the table shows the year in which the limits went into e®ect and the year in which limit was¯rst binding. The table shows the extent to which term limits vary across states, across o±ces, and over time.
Term Limits As Natural Experiments
To correct for potential biases due to strategic retirement, term limits must be a very strong predictor of retirements and term limits must satisfy the excludability assumption.
The¯rst stage regressions show the strength of the assignment variable. Table 1 presents the results of the regressions predicting the incidence of incumbent-contested races. For this analysis, the dependent variable is a trichotomy that equals +1 if a Democratic incumbent runs for reelection, 0 if a seat is open, and -1 if a Republican incumbent runs for reelection.
The regression includes indicators of term-limited Democratic incumbents and term-limited Republican incumbents. These are the excluded exogenous variables. The regression also includes year e®ects (to capture national tides), and a measure of the normal vote|either state¯xed-e®ects, the survey-based measure of partisanship, or lagged vote plus lagged party control. The table displays the results for three di®erent models, corresponding to three di®erent measures of the normal vote.
[ Table 1] The full sample in Table 1 consists of all states. The restricted sample consists of only those o±ces subject to term limits. As discussed below this is an important model check.
The speci¯cations explain most of the variation in retirements. For statewide elections, the adjusted R 2 for all three models is quite high: term limits, party tides, and normal vote explain 67 to 72 percent of the variation in the retirement variable. For state legislative elections, the adjusted R 2 is higher still, accounting for 80 percent of the variation.
Almost all of this is accounted for by the term limit variable. For example, for Model 2 the partial R-squared of the term limit variable is .65 using the whole sample and the overall R-squared is .67; for the restricted sample the partial R-squared of the term limit variable is .69 and the overall R-squared is .72. So, party tides and the normal vote combined only account for about 3 percent of the variation in retirements.
Our¯ndings about the normal vote and party tides are consistent with research on the US House. Kiewiet and Zeng (1993) ¯nd that age is by far the strongest predictor of voluntary retirement from the U.S. House. Scandals are a distant second in predicting House retirements. The normal vote and party tides have no signi¯cant e®ects.
The bottom line seems to be this. People run when they can, and retire when they must { because of age, shame, or term limits.
Term limits prove to be an extremely strong predictor of retirements, even in the face of year and state¯xed-e®ects. The coe±cient on whether an incumbent can run again in statewide elections ranges from +.64 to +.71, depending on the model. The t-statistic on this e®ect ranges from 35 to 60, depending on the model. In state legislative elections, the e®ects are greater still. These e®ects need not have proved so signi¯cant if it were the case that many incumbents would have retired voluntarily before the term limit went into e®ect.
The predictive power of term limits indicates that the natural experiment has power.
In addition to their statistical strength, the term limit variables also appear to satisfy the exclusion restriction. Most of the term limits in our analysis come from laws passed long before the period of study. In our sample, seventy percent of the state executives that are term-limited occur in states that imposed the restriction on their executives before the 1970s. The states that limit legislative terms adopt those restrictions in the early 1990s;
those limits become binding in the late 1990s. The state legislative analysis is consistent with the state executive analysis, so we are con¯dent that the term limit is \causally prior."
We see two further objections to the use of term limits as an instrument. First, the very presence of term limits may a®ect the behavior of o±ceholders. We assume that statewide o±ceholders run equally hard for reelection whether or not they are in o±ces subject to term limits. We also assume that lame-duck o±ceholders do not act in ways that hurt their party's chances in the upcoming open-seat race to replace them. Second, the states that adopt term limits might themselves be unique, and less hospitable to incumbents. Table 2 shows that the average Democratic percent of the two party vote was 59.6 in the states with term limits and 60.3 in the states without term limits, a statistically and substantively trivial di®erence.
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Estimates of Incumbency Advantages
To assess the e®ects of strategic retirement on incumbency advantage estimates, we compare the ordinary least squares and instrumental variables estimates. Table 3 displays the estimated incumbency e®ects using conventional methods and using term limits to adjust for possible biases. Complete regression results are contained in Table   A3 . Results from a range of speci¯cations are displayed. Models (1), (2), and (3) Using term limits to correct for strategic retirements yields somewhat di®erent estimates.
Looking at all o±ces, the IV estimates of the incumbency advantage are 8.6 percentage points in all three models. The IV estimates, then, are one-half to one-percentage point higher than in the conventional OLS estimates.
The di®erence between these methods is statistically signi¯cant. Below each pair of estimates is the Hausman test for the equality of the coe±cients. Assuming term limits are a valid instrument, then the IV estimates will be unbiased but less e±cent than OLS, and OLS may be biased. This test assesses whether there is a statistically signi¯cant change in the coe±cient from the more e±cient but possibly biased OLS estimates to the less e±cient but less biased IV estimate. For Models 1 and 2, the di®erence between the OLS and IV estimates are larger than one would expect to observe by chance (at the .05 level).
Particularly striking, though, are the similarities among the estimates in Table 3 The estimates contradict the strategic retirement hypothesis in one other respect. The strategic retirement hypothesis predicts that the estimated incumbency e®ect should fall after the adjusting for strategic retirement. In fact, the coe±cients rise, slightly.
There are many reasons why this could occur. First, strategic retirement on net appears to have little e®ect on the estimates. Second, the instrumental variables estimator corrects for other possible problems. Third, the strategic retirement hypothesis infact has ambiguous predictions: the direction of the bias depends on the relationship between omitted factors and incumbency and on the relationship between omitted factors and the vote.
What About Challenger Quality?
Who runs against incumbents also matters for election outcomes. There is considerable disagreement within the elections literature about how to handle the quality of the opposing candidates when estimating the incumbency advantage. The disagreement runs along two lines: (1) whether challenger quality has a separate e®ect or is part of the incumbency advantage, and (2) whether challenger quality is endogenous or exogenous.
Previous research has taken three di®erent approaches to challenger quality in predicting the vote. First, some analyses simply omit any measures of challenger experience or ability from the model, because challenger quality is part of the incumbency advantage. 11 Second, following Jacobson (1978) , much of the literature includes indicators previous o±ces held as a measure of challenger quality. Third, some researchers try to subtract out challenger e®ects using multiple observations of the same challenger and incumbent involved in an election (Levitt and Wolfram 1997; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000) . The latter two approaches tacitly assume that challenger quality has a direct e®ect on the vote, beyond what is captured by incumbency, and that challenger quality is not correlated with the regression error.
The analysis in Table 3 follows the thinking expressed by Gelman and King and others.
Rather than parse the incumbency advantage into its di®erent sources, the analyses in Table   3 estimate the overall magnitude, correcting for the bias in the estimates created by strategic retirement.
We can also incorporate conventional measures of challenger quality in the model, as
Jacobson and others do. The biographical information in the database allows us to measure whether a general election candidate has previously held state-level or federal o±ce. We use three indicators of challenger quality: (1) candidates who held some other statewide o±ce (including U.S. Senate), (2) candidates who held U.S. House seats in small states, and (3) candidates who had previously won U.S. House seats in large states.
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When we include these indicators of experience in the analyses represented in Table   3 , we¯nd that challenger quality indeed matters, but it has little e®ect on the estimated incumbency e®ect. The new estimates are shown in Table 4 . Candidates who previously held a statewide o±ce won about 2 percentage points more of the vote than other candidates. In 11 Gelman and King (1990, page 1153 ) justify this speci¯cation decision as follows: \including a measure of the quality of the opposition candidate would be tempting but inappropriate because the quality of the opposition candidate is largely dependent on the incumbent's decision about whether to run for reelection."
12 We de¯ne small states as those with four or fewer U.S. House districts. We experimented with dummy variables for state legislators, but found that they do not have higher vote margins than other candidates running for statewide o±ce. We do not include these variables in any of the regressions reported in the paper. [ Table 4 ] These results suggest that even though challenger quality matters, it is not an important explanation of the incumbency advantage. An experienced challenger who has won o±ce from the jurisdiction, in our case statewide, brings considerable electoral advantages, but those are unique to that candidate. The estimated incumbency advantage, but the estimated advantage is not attenuated by the inclusion of challenger quality. The best evidence of this is found in interactions between incumbency and challenger quality indicators. When we included such interactions in Models 1, 2, and 3 we found no substantively important interactions, and all but two of the interactions were statistically insigni¯cant. The two sign¯cant interactions had opposite signs, indicating the instability of the interactions.
Behind this analysis lies the assumption that challengers a®ect vote shares and that entry is exogenous. Behind the analysis of Table 3 lies the assumptions either that challenger e®ects are independent from incumbency e®ects or that challenger entry is entirely endogenous.
Both perspectives may be partly right: Challengers may directly a®ect the vote and entry may be partly endogenous.
13 If so, then quality should be included in the analysis, but some correction for the resulting simultaneity would be required.
The fact that including challenger quality in the analysis had little e®ect on the incumbency estimates suggests that challenger quality is orthogonal to incumbency and may even be exogenous.
To test this further we attempted to instrument for challenger quality using the number of other statewide o±cers who were term-limited. Speci¯cally, when a state-wide o±cer, such as an attorney general, is term-limited he or she may be more likely to run for governor, so the governor is more likely to face an experienced challenger. This instrumental variable gives us some leverage, but it is weak. The R-square for the regression explaining whether an experienced opponent runs is .06, but the t-statistic on number of other statewide o±cers who are term-limited is 3.5.
The incumbency advantage estimates change little, after correcting for strategic entry.
The estimated incumbency e®ects when we instrument for challenger quality di®er by about one-half of one percentage point from the IV estimates in Table 3 . Moreover, the Hausman tests easily reject the hypothesis that instrumenting for challenger quality improves on the analyses in Table 4 . In other words, we have no evidence to support the claim that challenger entry is endogenous. These results may be due to the relative weakness of the instruments, but term limits do o®er some leverage over entry. More likely, the e®ects of entry on incumbency are independent from the incumbency advantage, as suggested by Table 4 , and challenger entry is by-and-large exogenous.
We view the analysis of the endogeneity of challenger quality as preliminary, but promising. Stronger instruments are desired, and will require careful and tedious research on the term lengths, term structure and district geographies of state elected o±cials. Also, as more state o±ceholders are term-limited in the coming election cycles we will gain more leverage.
These preliminary results suggest that eventually scholars will be able to use term limits to untangle the endogeneity of challenger entry. Our preliminary estimates, though, suggest that the challenger entry may in fact be exogenous.
Discussion
Strategic retirement has long been considered a leading factor contributing to the magnitude and growth of the incumbency advantage in American elections. Tests of this conjecture have been di±cult because of the simultaneity between retirements and the expected vote.
Previous studies o®er indirect evidence in support for the conjecture (e.g., Cox and Katz, 2002 politicians abandon o±ce when they must, because of law or personal circumstances.
However much it occurs, strategic retirement cannot explain either the magnitude of the incumbency advantage in state elections today or the growth of the incumbency advantage over the last 50 years.
14 Standard tests for instrument validity based on overidenti¯cation, such as Hausman's test, require at least on valid instrument.
15 Further evidence of strategic behavior is the jump in U.S. House and state legislative retirements during redistricting years. Number of observations in parentheses. In AK, HI, ME, NH, and NJ there are no statewide races other than Senate and Governor.
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